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LaGrone: Recovery of a Florida Judgment by Garnishing Wages of the Head of

RECOVERY OF A FLORIDA JUDGMENT BY
GARNISHING WAGES OF THE HEAD
OF A FAMILY
TONQUIN GAINES LAGRONE*

Garnishment, as distinguished from attachment or other creditor
proceedings, denotes a method used by creditors to obtain satisfaction
of an indebtedness from a defendant-debtor's property that is in the
possession of a third person known as the garnishee.1 The garnishment proceeding is equitable in nature and is ancillary or dependent
upon the main action. Upon successful conclusion of the garnishment
proceeding, the plaintiff becomes subrogated to the defendant's rights
2
against the garnishee.
The recovery device of garnishment is exclusively statutory3 and
4
therefore was unknown at common law. Florida's garnishment laws
are probably among the poorest and most misleading of the several
jurisdictions of the United States. Section 77.01 of the Florida Statutes
provides:
Every person who shall have brought a suit to recover a debt
or shall have recovered a judgment in any court of this state
against any person, natural or corporate, shall have a right to
a writ of garnishment, in a manner hereinafter provided, to
subject any indebtedness due to the defendant by a third person, and any goods, money, chattels or effects of the defendants
in the hands, possession or control of a third person....
The seemingly broad coverage of section 77.01 is diminished
considerably by a host of exclusions, exemptions, and limitations appearing within the statutes.5 Items of property that might otherwise
be considered garnishable are excluded by obscure sections of the
*B.S. 1955, LL.B. 1962, University of Florida; Member, American Judicature
Society; Member, American Trial Lawyers' Association; Member of Orange County,
Florida, Bar.
1. E.g., McLeod v. Cooper, 88 F.2d 194 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 301 U.S. 705
(1937); Pleasant Valley Farms v. Carl, 90 Fla. 420, 106 So. 427 (1925); Posselius v.
First Nat'l Bank, 264 Mich. 687, 251 N.W. 429 (1933), cert. denied, 292 U.S. 627
(1934); Lynch v. Johnson, 196 Va. 516, 84 S.E.2d 419 (1954).
2. Pleasant Valley Farms v. Carl, 90 Fla. 420, 106 So. 427 (1925).
3. Williams v. T. R. Sweat & Co., 103 Fla. 461, 137 So. 698 (1931); Pleasant
Valley Farms v. Carl, 90 Fla. 420, 106 So. 427 (1925); Duval County v. Charleston
Lumber Co., 45 Fla. 256, 33 So. 531 (1903). See also Olsen v. National Grocery Co.,
15 Wash. 2d 164, 130 P.2d 78 (1942).
4. FLA. STAT. ch. 77 (1963).
5. E.g., FLA. STAT. §77.02 (1963) (no garnishment prior to judgment in tort
actions).
[196]
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Florida statutes; for example: wages due to a deceased employee, G
proceeds or cash surrender values of a life insurance policy unless the
policy was effected for the benefit of such creditor,7 disability income
benefits,8 fraternal benefit society payments, 9 teacher retirement benefits,1° recoveries by persons injured that come within the purview of
the hazardous occupations act,"1 and benefits derived under work2
men's compensation.
The courts have further limited the availability of garnishment
by requiring that the action be for an "indebtedness due .
'.."13An
indebtedness due refers to a debt that is due or that will become due
absolutely and is not dependent upon any contingency.-4 If there is
anything to be done, except possibly a "few odds and ends,"'15 before
liability is fixed, there is no indebtedness due. 6 Future earnings that
are dependent upon performance of employment are not an indebtedness due.' 7 The courts have extended the term "contingent" to indude also: a debt due a partnership where the judgment debtor is a
partner s and a legacy prior to a probate order directing payment
to the legatee who is also the judgment-debtor. 9 The limitation of indebtedness due is not the only prerequisite to invoking the garnishment statute; it must also be found that the garnishee has actual
possession of the defendant's property together with privity of con2
tract and interest between the garnishee and principal defendant. 0
6. FLA. STAT. §§222.15-.16 (1963).
7. FLA. STAT. §§222.13-.14 (1963).
8. FLA. STAT. §222.18 (1963).
9. FLA. STAT. §632.271 (1963).
10. FLA. STAT. §238.15 (1963).
11. FLA. STAT. §769.05 (1963).
12. FLA. STAT. §440.22 (1963).
13. FLA. STAT. §77.01 (1963); see Michael v. American Fire & Cas. Co., 82
F.2d 583 (5th Cir. 1936); Standard Acc. Ins. Co. v. Hancock, 124 Fla. 725, 169 So.
617 (1936) (the requirement that sums garnishable are to be "indebtedness due"
has generally been construed rather broadly); Alabama Hotel Co. v. J. L. Mott
Iron Works, 86 Fla. 608, 98 So. 825 (1924). See also McLeod v. Cooper, 88 F.2d 194
(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 301 U.S. 705 (1937); Hollopeter & Post v. Saenz, 133 Fla.
279, 182 So. 906 (1938); Huot, Kelly & Co. v. Ely, Candee & Wilder, 17 Fla. 775
(1880).
14. Chaachou v. Kulhanjian, 104 So. 2d 23 (Fla. 1958); Moss v. Sperry, 140
Fla. 301, 191 So. 531 (1939); Williams v. T. R. Sweat & Co., 103 Fla. 461, 137 So.
698 (1931); West Fla. Grocery Co. v. Teutonia Fire Ins. Co., 74 Fla. 220, 77 So.
209 (1917).
15. Alabama Hotel Co. v. J. L. Mott Iron Works, 86 Fla. 608, 98 So. 825 (1924).
16. Chaachou v. Kulhanjian, supra note 14.
17. Ibid.
18. Crescent Ins. Co. v. Baer, 23 Fla. 50, 1 So. 318 (1887).
19. Post v. Love, 19 Fla. 634 (1883).
20. Huot, Kelly & Co. v. Ely, Candee & Wilder, 17 Fla. 775 (1880). But see
Poole v. Travelers Ins. Co., 130 Fla. 806, 179 So. 138 (1938).
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This seemingly never-ending list of sources of debtor protections
also includes the Florida Constitution, which exempts personal property to the extent of $1,000 from any type of execution when the
21
property is owned by the head of a family residing in the state..
This is a blanket exemption that allows the debtor discretion in
selecting the property to which the exemption shall attach. A municipal corporation, county, state, or governmental agency, and any
property held by the courts in custodia legis also appear to be exempt
2
from the garnishment writ.
DEBTOR'S PARADISE

The principal exemption allowed a Florida debtor shields amounts
due to the head of a family for personal labor or services. 23 Although
there are few reported appellate decisions construing this statutory
provision, it has been given the broadest possible application.24 The
First District Court of Appeal stated that in order for a judgment
creditor to prevail he must strictly comply with the garnishment
statutes25 even to the extent of affirmatively negating under oath the
application of the wage earner exemption. 2 6 The court further stated
that the exemption statute was to be construed liberally and the expressed purpose of the exemption was to protect citizens against
financial reverses and difficulties.27 This protection permits the citizen
residing in Florida as the head of a family to be secure in the salary
coming to him for his labor and services. It guarantees continued
support for the members of his family and prevents them from becoming public charges.28 As a result of this exemption, the Florida
money lender must either receive a mortgage for his trust or must
rely on the word of his debtor because money judgments are practically uncollectible in this debtor's paradise when the lender relies
solely on wages as a source of funds for repayment.
21.

See FLA. CONST. art. X, §1; FLA. STAT. §222.06 (1963).

22. Young v. Stoutamire, 131 Fla. 535, 179 So. 797 (1938); Tyler v. Ackerman,
85 Fla. 485, 96 So. 838 (1923); Michigan Lumber & Mfg. Co. v. Duval County, 45
Fla. 472, 34 So. 245 (1903); Duval County v. Charleston Lumber Mfg. Co., 45 Fla.
256, 33 So. 531 (1903).
23. FLA. STAT. §§222.11-.12 (1963).
24. White v. Johnson, 59 So. 2d 532 (Fla. 1952); Wolf v. Commander, 137
Fla. 313, 188 So. 83 (1939); Patten Package Co. v. Houser, 102 Fla. 603, 136 So. 353
(1931); Noland Co. v. Linning, 132 So. 2d 802 (1st D.C.A. Fla. 1961).
25. Noland Co. v. Linning, 132 So. 2d 802, 804 (1st D.C.A. Fla. 1961), citing
Corbin v. St. Lucie River Co., 78 So. 2d 396 (Fla. 1955).
26. Id. at 803.
27. Id. at 803, citing Wolf v. Commander, 137 Fla. 313, 188 So. 83 (1939) where
the Florida Supreme Court was evenly divided. But see White v. Johnson, 59 So.
2d 532 (Fla. 1952) where the Wolf decision was grudgingly upheld.
28. Wolf v. Commander, 137 Fla. 313, 188 So. 83 (1939).
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Although Florida excludes the entire wages of some wage earners,
it allows the creditor to garnish all wages and salaries due to those
29
persons who unfortunately do not qualify as the head of a family.
Also, a nonresident wage earner seems to be excluded from the protection of the statute.
The frustrated Florida lawyer and his creditor-client will find
nothing in recent Florida legislation to allow them to reach the wages
of the head of a family. The principal purpose of this article is to
focus on the problems that face honest creditors that seek to recover
from the resident wage earner who is the head of a family.30 Those
who find Florida a debtor's paradise are usually among the class that
makes sufficient income to be a good credit risk and whose money is
the product of personal labor and services. Upon receipt of salary
and wages, its exempt status is retained by immediate conversion into
property exempted by the homestead provisions and personalty owned
as tenants by the entirety.
GARNISHMENT OUTSIDE FLORIDA

The prohibition against garnishment of a wage earner's income
stems from the Florida Statutes: 31
No writ of attachment or garnishment or other process shall
issue from any of the courts of this state to attach or delay the
payment of any money or other thing due to any person who is
the head of a family residing in this state, when the money or
other thing is due for the personal labor or services of such
person.
The provision "from any of the courts of this state . ." expresses
the unequivocal condition that this exemption is applied solely to
the issuance of writs of attachment or garnishment from courts of
the State of Florida. Florida's statute has no application whatever to
writs issued by courts of other jurisdictions. The statutory provisions
of other jurisdictions allowing garnishment of wages may apply to
residents of Florida whose property rights are located within those
other jurisdictions. Even where the foreign jurisdiction has an exemption statute similar to the Florida statute, it is likely that the
statute will be inapplicable to a nonresident wage earner.
-

29. Richardson v. Grill, 68 F.2d 737 (5th Cir. 1934); Patten Package Co. v.
Houser, 102 Fla. 603, 136 So. 353 (1931); Noland Co. v. Linning, 132 So. 2d 802
(1st D.C.A. Fla. 1961); FLA. STAT. §222.11 (1963).
30. 3 FiA. JUR. Attachment and Garnishment §56 (1955); see 36 FLA. B.J.
1085 (1962) for collection procedures.
31. FLA. STAT. §222.11 (1963). (Emphasis added.)

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol17/iss2/3

4

LaGrone: Recovery of a Florida Judgment by Garnishing Wages of the Head of
UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA LA TV REVIEW

[[Vol. XVII

A conflict of laws problem is presented when the garnishment
or attachment laws of different jurisdictions vary. Comity and constitutional full faith and credit do not apply. 32 The great weight of
authority is that statutory exemptions granting immunity from garnishment pertain merely to remedies, not to substantive law, and have
no extraterritorial force or effect.

3

In garnishment proceedings, the

law of the forum is applied and not the law of the situs of the
primary debt or the domicile of the debtor-defendant. 34 Thus, when
an action is brought beyond the limits of the state of domicile, the
debtor may be deprived of the exemption granted to him by his
domicile. It is generally held that although both the creditor and
debtor have the same domicile, the exemption laws of the domicile
do not control garnishment proceedings instituted in another state. 35
Consequently, any indebtedness that was created and made payable
in the domiciliary state may be garnished in a foreign state, even
though the assets would be exempt in the domicile, if the garnishee
can be found in the foreign state.3 6 This has been held to be controlling even though the proceeding was a palpable scheme devised
to evade the exemption laws of the state in which the debt arose and
37

was properly payable.

In Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific Railway v. Sturm,38 a Kansas
resident sued his employer in a Kansas court for his wages. The defendant asked that the proceeding be continued because the wages
had been garnished in a prior Iowa suit by a creditor of the employee.
The request was denied and judgment was entered for the plaintiffemployee on the theory that plaintiff's wages were exempt from
creditor's process under Kansas law and that "the exemption will
follow the debt as an incident thereto into any other state or jurisdic32. Chicago R.I. & Pac. Ry. v. Sturm, 174 U.S. 710 (1899).
33. Sanders v. Armour Fertilizer Works, 292 U.S. 190 (1934) (5-4 decision),
affirming, 63 F.2d 902 (5th Cir. 1933) (2-1 decision); Chicago R.I. & Pac. Ry. v.
Sturm, 174 U.S. 710 (1899); see, e.g., Huron Holding Corp. v. Lincoln Mine
Operating Co., 312 U.S. 183 (1941); Green v. Van Buskirk, 72 U.S. (5 Wall.) 307
(1866); United States v. Miller, 229 F.2d 839 (3d Cir. 1952); French v. Hall, 9 N.H.
137 (1838); Morris Plan Industrial Bank v. Gunning, 295 N.Y. 324, 67 N.E.2d 510
(1946).
34. E.g., United States v. Miller, 229 F.2d 839 (3d Cir. 1952); Wabash R.R. v.
Dougan, 142 Ill. 248, 31 N.E. 594 (1892); Morris Plan Industrial Bank v. Gunning,
295 N.Y. 324, 67 N.E.2d 510 (1946); Dye v. General Motors Corp., 26 Misc. 2d 264,
205 N.Y.S.2d 548 (Sup. Ct. 1960); Clark v. Elting, 38 Wash. 376, 80 Pac. 556 (1905).
35. Sanders v. Armour Fertilizer Works, supra note 33; United States Rubber
Co. v. Poage, 297 F.2d 670 (5th Cir. 1962); Burlington & M.R. Ry. v. Thompson,
31 Kan. 180, 1 Pac. 622 (1884).
36. Lyon v. Callopy, 87 Iowa 567, 54 N.W. 476 (1893).
37. Harwell v. Sharp, 85 Ga. 124, 11 S.E. 561 (1890).
38. 174 U.S. 710 (1899).

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1964

5

Florida Law Review, Vol. 17, Iss. 2 [1964], Art. 3
1964]

GARNISHING WAGES

tion into which the debt may be supposed to be carried."3 9 Since the
Iowa proceeding had been denied full faith and credit, the Kansas
case was subsequently reversed. The reversing court stated that the
Kansas exemption laws "are not a part of the contract; they are a
part of the remedy and subject to the law of the forum." 40 Not all
states will allow their exemption statutes to be circumvented so easily
and will enjoin a foreign proceeding by a resident creditor against
a resident debtor if the creditor could have brought an action in the
state of residence. 41 This resort to injunction by a resident state will
not violate the full faith and credit clause or the privileges and im42
munities clause of the United States Constitution.
Several courts have held that when a resident creditor resorts to
out-of-state garnishment proceedings to get around local exemption
statutes, he will be liable in damages to the resident debtor. These
damages have been allowed both when the creditor has proceeded in
disregard of a prior injunction,43 and when there has been no injunction issued at the time of the proceeding.44 A few states now have
statutory provisions for criminal and personal liability of a resident
creditor who resorts to out-of-state garnishment in order to circumvent the domicile's wage exemptions.45 - These statutes have withstood
attacks under the federal full faith and credit clause,46 privileges and

39. Id. at 717.
40. Ibid.
41. Wilson v. Joseph, 107 Ind. 490, 8 N.E. 616 (1886); Hager v. Adams, 70
Iowa 746, 30 N.V. 36 (1886); Teager v. Landsley, 69 Iowa 725, 27 N.W. 739 (1886);
Keyser v. Rice, 47 Md. 203 (1877); Wierse v. Thomas, 145 N.C. 261, 59 S.E. 58
(1907); Snook v. Snetzer, 25 Ohio St. 516 (1874); see Mumper v. Wilson, 72 Iowa
163, 33 N.W. 449 (1887); Zimmerman v. Franke, 34 Kan. 650, 9 Pac. 747 (1886).
42. Cole v. Cunningham, 133 U.S. 107 (1899); Keyser v. Rice, 47 Md. 203
(1877).
43. Hager v. Adams, supra note 41; Teager v. Landsley, supra note 41.
44. Stark v. Bare, 39 Kan. 100, 17 Pac. 826 (1888); O'Connor v. Walter, 37
Neb. 267, 55 N.W. 867 (1893); Anderson v. Canaday, 37 Okla. 171, 131 Pac. 697
(1913) (creditor's lawyer held liable). Cf. Kestler v. Kern, 2 Ind. App. 488, 28 N.E.
726 (1891); Drake v. Lake Shore & M.S. Ry., 69 Mich. 168, 37 N.W. 70 (1888)
(where courts have refused to entertain the out-of-state suit brought to evade the
exemption laws of the state of plaintiff's and defendant's residence). Contra,
Harwell v. Sharp, 85 Ga. 124, 11 S.E. 561 (1890); Uppinghouse v. Mundel, 103 Ind.
238, 2 N.E. 719 (1885); Stevens v. Brown, 20 W. Va. 450 (1882). See also Person v.
Williams-Echols Dry Goods Co., 113 Ark. 467, 169 S.W. 223 (1914); Missouri Pac.
R.R. v. Maltby, 34 Kan. 125, 8 Pac. 235 (1885).
45. IND. ANN. STAT. §10-4904 (1956); NEB. REv. STAT. §§25-1560 to 25-1563
(1956); N.M. STAT. ANN. §26-2-36 (1953); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§95-73 to 95-77 (1950);
OHio REV. CODE ANN. §§2917.37-.40 (Page 1953); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, §§91-93
(1955); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, §§2175-2180. (1951).
46. Bishop v. Middleton, 43 Neb. 10, 61 N.W. 129 (1894); Singer Mfg. Co. v.
Fleming, 39 Neb. 679, 58 N.W. 226 (1894).

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol17/iss2/3

6

LaGrone: Recovery of a Florida Judgment by Garnishing Wages of the Head of
UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol.
XVII
[

immunities clause, 4 7 fourteenth amendment, 48 and state constitutional
provisions.4 9 These statutes in no way deprive the garnishee, when
he is sued by the principal debtor, of using the defense of prior payment under the garnishment order. 50
If the creditor resides in a state other than that in which the debtor
resides, and pursues property of the debtor found outside the debtor's
state there are very few restrictions on the creditor. 51 One restriction
is that under the doctrine of forum non conveniens a court may, in
its discretion, decline to entertain a suit between nonresidents. This
is true whether the suit is based on in personam jurisdiction5 2 or
upon seizure of property.5 3 The privileges and immunities clause of
the federal constitution imposes the limitation that this doctrine
cannot be applied discriminatorily between nonresident citizens of
54
the forum and nonresident citizens of other states.
To summarize, it is clear that the law of the state in which a garnishment proceeding is commenced prevails as the law of the forum,
and the law of the state where the debtor resides has no extraterritorial effect and cannot be considered an obstacle to the creditor's
action.
JURISDICTION
5
The United States Supreme Court decision in Harris v. Balk 5
clearly indicates that jurisdiction over the garnishee is proper in any
state where the garnishee can be found, even though his stay therein
is temporary. The case also indicates that a judgment rendered by
that state requires full faith and credit by other jurisdictions. This
does not prevent a collateral attack upon the judgment if the court
in the first instance failed to acquire jurisdiction over the judgmentdebtor.56 The United States Supreme Court held in the celebrated

47. Sweeney v. Hunter, 145 Pa. 863, 22 At. 653 (1891).
48. Markley v. Murphy, 180 Ind. 4, 102 N.E. 376 (1913).
49. Gordon Bros. v. Wageman, 77 Neb. 185, 108 N.W. 1067 (1906); Hinds v.
Sells, 63 Ohio St. 328, 58 N.E. 800 (1900). See also St. Louis & S.F. Ry. v. Crews,
51 Okla. 144, 151 Pac. 879 (1915).
50. Baltimore & O.S.W.R.R. v. Adams, 159 Ind. 688, 66 N.E. 43 (1903).
51. King v. Cross, 175 U.S. 396 (1899); Security Trust Co. v. Dodd, Mead & Co.,
173 U.S. 624 (1899); Griffith v. Langsdale, 53 Ark. 71, 13 S.W. 733 (1890).
52. Price v. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry. 42 Cal. 2d 577, 268 P.2d 457, cert. denied,
348 U.S. 839 (1954), 43 A.L.R.2d 774 (1955).
53. National Tel. Mfg. Co. v. Dubois, 165 Mass. 117, 42 N.E. 510 (1896). See
also Bethlehem Fabricators, Inc. v. H. D. Watts Co., 286 Mass. 556, 190 N.E. 828
(1934), 93 A.L.R. 1133.
54. Missouri ex rel. Southern Ry. v. Mayfield, 340 U.S. 1 (1950).
55. 198 U.S. 215 (1905).
56. See Chicago R.I. & Pac. Ry. v. Sturm, 174 U.S. 710 (1899).
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case of Pennoyer v. Neff57 that a judgment against a nonresident defendant without personal service of process is unconstitutional, unless
the action is in rem in which case substituted service by publication
or other authorized form would be sufficient to inform the parties of
the object of the proceedings. The basis for this exception is that
the law assumes that property is always in the possession of its owner,
in person or by agent, and seizure of the property will inform him that
it has been taken into the custody of the court. The defendant must
then comply with statutory and court requirements in order to contest the seizure and ultimate sale of the property. To effectuate the
aim of a recovery from a Florida wage earner, a proceeding in a nonresident state must be one that complies with the Pennoyer v. Neff
requirements of adequate notice to prevent a collateral attack for lack
of jurisdiction.
Where the suit is in personam, constructive service upon a nonresident to gain jurisdiction of the defendant's person is ineffectual
and unconstitutional. Thus, an action based upon garnishment in a
foreign jurisdiction without personal service upon the judgment
debtor or principal defendant must not be merely an action in
personam. If the action is merely in personam, the court would lack
jurisdiction of the matter and the judgment debtor could collaterally
attack the garnishment judgment that was rendered in a nondomiciliary state. He could avoid the requirement of full faith and credit
and force the garnishee into paying to him the sum of the debt due.
This would create the problem of double liability of the garnishee.
Therefore, the foreign garnishment action must be one in rem or
quasi-in rem, and not merely in personam, in order to prevent col58
lateral attack and the possibility of double liability of the garnishee.
The landmark decision in this area is Sanders v. Armour Fertilizer
Works,59 which appears to turn upon the in rem aspect of a garnishment action. In this case two insurance companies owed Sanders the
proceeds of fire insurance policies because of the partial destruction
by fire of his Texas homestead. These proceeds were exempt from
attachment by the Texas Constitution. Sanders was indebted to
Armour who brought action on the debt in Illinois. The two insurance companies were joined in the Illinois action as garnishees.
The action was enjoined by the Federal District Court in Texas after
the insurance companies fied interpleader proceedings in which
Sanders and Armour were made defendants. Sanders defended the
Texas action by pleading the exemption under Texas law and Armour contended that the exemption law did not apply and that pre57. 95 US. 714 (1887).
58. Harris v. Balk, 198 U.S. 215 (1905); Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1887).
59. 292 U.S. 190 (1934) (5-4 decision), affirming, 63 F.2d 902 (5th Cir. 1933)
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vailing garnishment rules must be determined by Illinois law. The
decision of the district court was reversed by the Fifth Circuit Court
of Appeals and the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari.
The decision of the court of appeals was affirmed in favor of Armour
by a four-five decision. The majority decision would seem to lend
credence to the argument that the district court acquired jurisdiction
when the Illinois garnishment action was filed. The rationale of this
opinion was that the garnishment proceeding in Illinois placed a
lien upon the property held by the garnishee and was therefore an
action in rem allowing jurisdiction of the dispute by seizure of the
debt. The dissent interpreted the Illinois garnishment proceedings as
not constituting a lien upon the property held by the garnishee. The
Supreme Court clearly indicated that state law prevails in determining
whether garnishment constitutes a lien. Justice Cardozo, who was
joined in his dissent by the Chief Justice, Mr. Justice Brandeis, and
Mr. Justice Stone, stated the jurisdictional problem as follows:6 °
True there had been a judgment against Sanders . . . but
this judgment had been obtained by default after service by
publication, not followed by an appearance. It was therefore
ineffective as a judgment in personam, and in the absence of a
lien did not operate in rem.
Although Cardozo cited Pennoyer v. Neff as authority for the rule that
unless a lien existed there would not be an in rem proceeding, the
opinion in that case did not mention a lien, nor does the majority in
Sanders v. Armour say unequivocally that a lien is necessary in order
to establish jurisdiction. But, the majority in Sanders did lend great
support to the lien problem, and this was the basis for the dissent of
four most eminent jurists. A subsequent decision on the jurisdiction
requirements in a garnishment proceeding was much more illuminating. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals stated:61
It is, of course, elementary that a judgment binding on the
person of a defendant may not be rendered in an action classified as in personam without some form of personal service
sufficient to satisfy the requirements of due process of law. A
statutory proceeding in garnishment, however, is not an action
in personam, nor is it, strictly speaking, a proceeding in rem.
Partaking of the nature of both, it is frequently classified as
a proceeding quasi in rem. . . . Service of the summons of
garnishment notifies the debtor not to pay the debt and operates

(2-1 decision).
60. Id. at 209 (Cardoza, J., dissenting). (Emphasis added.)
61. United States Rubber Co. v. Poage, 297 F.2d 670, 673 (5th Cir. 1962).
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both upon the person of the garnishee and the debt itself ....
It is no impediment to the validity of a judgment in garnishment that there was no service, constructive or otherwise, on
the debtor [principal defendant] of the plaintiff in garnishment, when the state statute does not require it .

. .

. At-

tachment and garnishment are creatures of the local law, and
if state law provides for the attachment of a debt, then, by
personal service upon a garnishee found in the state, the
court acquires jurisdiction over him and can garnish the debt
due from him to the debtor of the plaintiff.
Generally, an attachment of property that is owned by and is
in the constructive possession of the debtor in a proceeding in a
foreign jurisdiction, becomes a lien on the property and is an in rem
proceeding.6 2 This is not necessarily the result in a garnishment proceeding. Whether or not garnishment creates a lien is determined
entirely by local law and the results are quite divergent among the
6 3
several jurisdictions. An encyclopedic work states:
The right created by garnishment, although frequently described as a lien, is not such in the strict sense, unless a statute
expressly so provides, but it is equivalent thereto and confers a
specific right on plaintiff to the indebtedness or property for
payment of his claim superior to that of general creditors.
Under some statutes a garnishment creates a lien on specific
property of the defendant in the hands of the garnishee which
will enable the garnisher to follow it into the hands of third
persons, but not on money in the hands of persons indebted
to defendant.
Whether a nonresident garnishment action could create problems of
double liability upon a jurisdictional ground appears to depend on
an issue of local law, namely, whether a writ of garnishment creates
a lien upon the debt of the garnishee, and is therefore an action
against the garnishee, making the debt a matter in rem or quasi-in
rem.
PREVENTION oF GARNISHEE'S DOUBLE LIABILITY

In order to prevent double liability in a case in which the garnishee is not certain whether the judgment will be res judicata in a
subsequent action by the principal debtor, the garnishee may file a bill
of interpleader. But it is unlikely that Florida interpleader would be
62. Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1887).
63. 38 C.J.S. Garnishment §181 (1943). (Emphasis added.)
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available to a garnishee. Florida has retained the essential requirement of strict common law interpleader that in order for a person to
maintain interpleader he must be a stakeholder of the property of
two or more persons whose titles are connected because one derives
title from the other, or the claims of title of both have a common
origin. Furthermore, they must claim from him the same thing, debt,
64
or duty and the stakeholder must not know which should succeed.
Clearly, the claim of an employee for his wages and the claim of a
garnishing creditor of the employee are without privity to or a common source of a fund held by an employer.
Under federal statutory interpleader,65 the stakeholder may bring
an action in a United States district court to join two or more parties
having claims upon money held by the stakeholder. Federal interpleader presents the jurisdictional requirements that the amount in
controversy must be $500 or more and there must be diversity of
citizenship. The requirement of diversity will be satisfied if there
is diversity between two of the defendants- or between the stakeholder and one of the defendants.67 The venue of the federal statutory
interpleader is in any state where one party is present and service of
process may also be made in any state where the parties may be
found.
The federal statutes expressly provide for interpleader in the
form of a bill in the nature of interpleader. This is distinguished from
a strict bill in that the stakeholder-complainant may have recourse
to the bill in order to ascertain and establish his own rights. The
proceeding in the nature of interpleader allows a determination of
the rights of the conflicting claimants and, in addition, an interpretation of the law of the state of garnishment and the law of the state
of residence. Thus, the stakeholder can avoid the possibility of a
subsequent judgment resulting in double liability through the use of
interpleader.65 It should be noted that although a bill in the nature
of interpleader is available in Florida, the strict common law interpleader requirements must still be observed as conditions precedent
to filing the suit.
A federal court in an interpleader action has the statutory power
to enjoin state court proceedings:6 9

64. Paul v. Harold Davis, Inc., 155 Fla. 538, 20 So. 2d 795 (1945); Jax Ice &
Cold Storage Co. v. South Fla. Farms Co., 91 Fla. 593, 109 So. 212 (1926); Fogg
v. Goode, 78 Fla. 138, 82 So. 614 (1919).
65. Interpleader Act, 28 U.S.C. §1335 (1958).
66. Holcomb v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 255 F.2d 577 (10th Cir. 1958).
67. Kerrigan's Estate v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, 199 F.2d 694 (3d Cir. 1952).
68. See 48 C.J.S. Interpleader §7 (1947).

69. 28 U.S.C. §2283 (1958).
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A court of the United States may not grant an injunction to
stay proceedings in a State court except as expressly authorized
by Act of Congress, or where necessary in aid of its jurisdiction,
or to protect or effectuate its judgments.
In National Fire Insurance Co. v. Sanders,70 the court held that a
federal court may enjoin proceedings in a state court in order to
preserve its jurisdiction in an interpleader suit. In addition, Congress
has enacted a specific provision allowing injunctions to be71issued by
district courts where an action of interpleader is involved:
In any civil action of interpleader or in the nature of interpleader under Section 1335 of this title [federal statutory interpleader], a district court may issue its process for all claimants and enter its order restraining them from instituting or
prosecuting any proceeding in any State or United States
court affecting the property, instrument or obligation involved
in the interpleader action until further order of the court....
These provisions unequivocally establish the power of federal courts
to enjoin state court action until the conclusion of a statutory interpleader suit.
In both of the above federal statutes, the injunctive power is
limited to "proceedings." Since a state court's final judgment that is
not appealed is technically no longer a proceeding, the federal court
may be prevented from enjoining its enforcement. This prevention is
certain if the question to be determined in the federal interpleader
action is the same as that litigated and determined in the prior state
action. Furthermore, under section 2283 of the United States Code,
federal courts may enjoin state proceedings where necessary "in aid
of its jurisdiction." In Nongard v. Burlington County Bridge Commission,72 the court held that an injunction against a final order of
a state court is not "in aid of its jurisdiction." In addition, the court
73
stated:
We think the district court was entirely correct in saying that
the restitution which plaintiffs now ask "would thwart the
very judgment imposed upon them by the New Jersey Supreme
Court." The issue is res judicata.
The Nongard case is generally cited for the rule of "estoppel by judgment," that is, a federal court cannot enjoin the enforcement of a state
court's judgment on an allegation that a state court of equity had
70.
71.
72.
73.

38 F.2d 212 (5th Cir. 1930).
Interpleader Act, 28 U.S.C. §2361 (1958).
229 F.2d 622 (3d Cir. 1956).
Id. at 626-27.
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adjudicated a controversy under state law in a way that was allegedly
arbitrary and grossly unfair to the party seeking the injunction. The
United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, in reviewing a
decision of the District Court for the Southern District of Florida in
74
the case of Syms v. McRitchie, stated:
The scope of the estoppel of a judgment depends upon
whether the question arises in a subsequent action between the
same parties upon the same claim or demand, or upon a different claim or demand. In the former case, a judgment upon
the merits is an absolute bar to a subsequent action, not only
with respect to matters determined in the former suit, but
also with respect to every matter which might have been
litigated to sustain or defeat the claim. In the latter case, the
inquiry is whether the point or question to be determined in
the later action is the same as that litigated and determined
in the prior action.
In order to avoid the situation in which the garnishee is forced
to attempt to use the interpleader procedure to avoid the possibility
of incurring double liability, the creditor should attempt to select
a state that unequivocally provides that garnishment will create a
lien. Admittedly, the garnishing plaintiff will not always be so fortunate as to find that his debtor has an employer who has sufficient
contact with several states to be amenable to a garnishment action.
But as the employer-garnishee class expands its area of operations,
as evidenced by the tremendous growth of chain stores and large
manufacturers in Florida in recent years, availability of foreign
garnishment and selectivity of the particular state should become an
easier matter.
CONCLUSION

Satisfaction of judgments against individual debtors who prefer
to resist voluntary payment is practically an impossible task. Many
recorded judgments remain hopelessly unsatisfied throughout Florida
in mute evidence of this impossibility. This situation is not due to an
inability to pay, but is a direct result of archaic, unrealistic legislation that has led to a debtor's paradise. If the Florida Legislature
would recognize the necessity for a continuing lien and small percentage garnishment, justice would prevail without the brutal hardships envisaged by earlier court rationales.

74.

187 F.2d 915, 918 (5th Cir. 1951).
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The New York statutes allow an exemption of wages, but it seems
to be more reasonable than that allowed by Florida. The statutes
provide:75

The following personal property is exempt from application to the satisfaction of a money judgment, except such part
as a court determines to be unnecessary for the reasonable
requirements of the judgment debtor and his dependents: ...
2. ninety per cent of the earnings of the judgment debtor
for his personal services rendered within sixty days before, and
at any time after, an income execution is delivered to the sheriff
or a motion is made to secure the application of the judgment debtor's earnings to the satisfaction of the judgment ....
The provisions7 6 allowing income execution provide that execution
may be served upon the judgment debtor's employer only if the
wage earner defaults on an installment. Such a scheme overcomes
the argument that is asserted in assignment and garnishment of wages
situations that it is the sole responsibility of the debtor to pay installments promptly and the creditor should avoid burdening the
debtor's employer with accounting details that may result in a lower
character rating of the debtor-employee in the eyes of his employer.
In addition, the New York Legislature did not forget the extremely
small wage earner because its statute places a thirty-dollar minimum
on wages that will be subject to income execution:77
Where a judgment debtor is receiving or will receive more than
thirty dollars per week from any person, an income execution
for installments therefrom of not more than ten percent thereof may be issued and delivered to the sheriff of the county in
which the judgment debtor resides or, where the judgment
debtor is a non-resident, the county in which he is employed.
The New York *Legislature has had the foresight to provide a
more realistic method than some other states when it made available
to judgment creditors, who have had their claims adjudicated by
courts of law, a procedure by which their claims may be collected.
The continuing levy and small percentage garnishment provisions protect the debtor's family from devastation, but also recognize that the
creditor needs to provide for his family. Such provisions should be
considered by the Florida Legislature, which has ignored past judicial

75. N.Y. Civ. PRAc. §5205 (e). (Emphasis added.)
76. N.Y. Civ. PRAc. §5231.
77. N.Y. Civ. PRAc. §5231 (b).
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pleas 8 for some modification of the present complete immunity enjoyed by Florida wage earners. Elimination of complete immunity
would not be detrimental to the debtor. Indeed, when effective recovery procedures are made available to lending agencies and merchants, more credit to the wage earner should inevitably result.
Until such enlightened legislation, the foreign garnishment procedure submitted here is a ray of hope for the long-abused creditor.
T

78. See White v. Johnson, 59 So. 2d 532 (Fla. 1952); Wolf v. Commander, 137
Fla. 313, 188 So. 83 (1939).
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